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CERTIFICATION OF GOOD FAITH
The undersigned counsel for petitioners hereby certifies
that this petition is presented in good faith and not for delay.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This is a petition for rehearing.

This matter originally

came before the Court on a petition for review of a final decision
made by the Utah State Tax Conunission
respect to the petitioners',

(the

"Conunission")

with

James and Beverly O'Rourke's

(the

"O'Rourkes") residency status for Utah State income tax purposes
during

the

determined
Returns

for

audit
that

periods
the

the

1983

0' Rourkes

years

1983

through
failed

through

1988.

The

Conunission

to

file

Utah

Income

Tax

1988

and

sent

notices

of

estimated income tax returns assessing unpaid Utah income taxes,
penalties and interest to the O'Rourkes totalling $24,300.89.
The O'Rourkes filed a petition for redetermination and
notice in letter form, which the Conunission answered on or about
February 5,

1990.

A formal hearing was held on the matter on

January 14, 1991, before Conunission Hearing Officer Paul Iwasaki.
At the hearing,

the sole issue was whether the 0' Rourkes were

residents of Utah for income tax purposes under Utah Code Ann.
§

59-20-103 (1) (j) (i).
On April 2, 1991, the Conunission issued its Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision finding that, for all
periods

in question,

income tax purposes.

the 0' Rourkes were residents of Utah for
On May 2, 1991, the O'Rourkes filed a notice

1

of petition for review of this court requesting a review of the
final decision.
This matter came before the Court on oral arguments on
December 3,

1991.

Stephen R.

Cochell argued on the O'Rourkes'

behalf and Mark E. Wainwright argued for the Commission.

This

Court filed its opinion in the matter (the "Opinion") on February
13,

1992,

holding that the Commission's determination that the

O'Rourkes established a domicile in Utah and intended to remain in
Utah for an indefinite time was supported by substantial evidence.
All

capitalized

but

undefined

terms,

and

all

abbreviations, used herein shall have the same meanings as those
ascribed to them in the O'Rourkes' brief.
ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the Court misapprehended the facts upon which

the Tax Commission relied in determining that the petitioner, James
O'Rourke, was domiciled in Utah from 1983 to 1988.
2.

Whether the Court overlooked the facts which proved

the Petitioner's intent to return to Florida.
3.

Whether the Court overlooked or misapprehended the

requirements in Tax Commission Rule 865-9-2I(D) and relevant case
law in finding that petitioner, James O'Rourke, was domiciled in
Utah for each of the years 1983 to 1988.

2

ARGUMENT
I.
THE FACTS RELIED UPON BY THIS COURT AND THE
COMMISSION
DO
NOT
SUPPORT
THE
COURT'S
DETERMINATION THAT JAMES O'ROURKE WAS DOMICILED
IN UTAH FROM 1983 TO 1988.
In its Opinion, the Court recites several facts which are
undisputed

and

which,

presumably,

were

relied

upon

by

the

Cormnission in determining that James 0' Rourke was domiciled in
Utah.

Among those facts are the following:
1.

The O'Rourkes purchased a home in the Olympus Cove

area of Salt Lake City;
2.

The O'Rourkes bought a home in Sandy, Utah for James

O'Rourke's parents;
3.

The O'Rourkes made improvements to both the Olympus

Cove and the Sandy properties;
4.

The O'Rourkes owned vehicles that were registered in

5.

Beverly O'Rourke

Utah;
had a

Utah driver's

license and

registered to vote in Utah;
6.

One

of

the

0' Rourkes'

daughters

attended

the

University of Utah and paid resident tuition; and
7.

The O'Rourkes listed Salt Lake City as their residence

on their federal income tax return.
Although

these

facts

may

support

the

conclusion that

Mrs. O'Rourke and her children were domiciled in Utah, they do not
support
state.

the

conclusion that Mr.

0' Rourke was domiciled in the

It is well established that the presence of a man's family
3

in a place (and even the existence of substantial contacts with an
alleged new domicile) do not cause a relinquishment of the family's
old domicile unless and until the husband has the actual intention
of making the "new domicile" the family's permanent home.

See New

York Trust Company v. Riley, 16 A.2d 772, 783-84 (Del. 1940).
The evidence relied upon by the Commission and considered
by the Court does not bear on Mr. O'Rourke's intent, which is the
crucial deterrnination in domicile law.

Indeed, the Commission's

own rules clearly provide that, absent the intent to create a new
domicile, no amount of physical contact with the State of Utah is
sufficient to subject a person to tax:
Domicile .
. is the place in which a person
has voluntarily fixed the habitation of himself
and family, not for a mere special or temporary
purpose, but with the present intention of
making a permanent home.
After domicile has
been established, two things are necessary to
create a new domicile: First, an abandonment of
the old domicile; and second, the intention and
establishment of a new domicile.
Tax Commission Rule 865-9-2I(D)

(emphasis added).

This rule espouses the axiomatic domiciliary concept that
physical presence in a location can never be the basis for the
creation of a domicile if the requisite intent to create a new
domicile is not present.
Regents v.

Harper,

See~,

495 P.2d 453

Riley, supra.; Arizona Bd. of

(Az.

1972); Allen v.

Greyhound

Lines, Inc., 583 P.2d 613 (Ut. 1978).
The facts relied upon by the Court are not dispositive of
James

0' Rourke's

intent.

The

Court

and

the

Commission made

assessments of the facts viewed as a whole and without reference to
4

when and how they arose; intent was inferred from this entire body
of facts.
The facts, when lumped together and viewed years later and
outside the

context

in which they occurred,

may support

the

inference that the 0' Rourkes were domiciled in Utah during the
years in question.
in this case.

That inference, however, was clearly rebutted

The only direct and express evidence regarding

intent which was before the Commission and this Court was the sworn
testimony of Mr. O'Rourke.

That testimony, which was unrebutted,

is that the O'Rourkes never had the intent to remain permanently or
indefinitely in Utah,

and that but for a series of unforeseen

economic and natural disasters, their contact with the state would
have been brief.

Tr. at 26, 56-57; Ex. P-17 at Response Nos. 3, 5

and 6.
Further, when viewed in the proper context and in light of
the testimony and other unrebutted evidence on the record,

the

facts relied upon by the Commission clearly do not support a
finding that the O'Rourkes formed the requisite intent to obtain
domiciliary status.

The Court and the Commission relied on the

facts that the O'Rourkes moved to Utah, purchased a home here and
then remained in the state for several years as evidence of the
O'Rourkes' intent to establish a domicile here.

This conclusion,

however, misapprehends the reasons for the O'Rourkes' purchase of
their Utah properties and why the O'Rourkes remained in Utah.
The evidence before the Commission on these issues clearly
shows

that

the

O'Rourkes

bought
5

their home

in Olympus

Cove

primarily for tax purposes and because they believed they could
sell it very quickly, at a very large profit, and that they could
use the profit to construct their home on the Eustis property and
hasten their return to Florida.

Tr. at 25-26; Ex. P-17 at Response

No. 9.
Similarly, the Commission and this Court misapprehended
the import and context of the O'Rourkes' improvements to their Utah
property, Mrs. O'Rourke's Utah driver's license and the O'Rourkes'
registration of automobiles in the state.

The only evidence before

the Commission and this Court regarding these matters clearly shows
that the O'Rourkes had no intent of establishing a domicile in Utah
by taking those actions.

Mr. O'Rourke's testimony established that

the O'Rourkes registered their cars in Utah and that Mrs. O'Rourke
obtained a Utah license because the O'Rourkes believed that such
actions were required by law of persons who used Utah roads other
than on an infrequent basis -- even when the persons using those
roads had no intent to remain permanently or indefinitely in Utah.
The O'Rourkes made improvements to their Utah property in the hope
that those improvements would make the properties more attractive
to potential buyers, and provide them with a greater return on
their investment which could be used towards the construction of
their home in Florida.

Tr. at 25-26; Ex. P-17 at Response No. 17.

Any conclusion that the 0' Rourkes took these actions
because they considered Utah to be their permanent place of abode
is unsupported by the evidence in the record.

6

Finally,

the

Commission

and

this

Court

apparently

misunderstood or overlooked the import of the natural and economic
disasters suffered by the O'Rourkes in concluding that they were
domiciled in Utah.

The O'Rourkes poured massive amounts of money,

energy

into

and

time

rehabilitate

it

after

their
the

Florida

numerous

property

freezes.

in

order

They also

to

spent

considerable amounts of time in Florida and maintained significant
and continuous contacts in that state.

See Tr. at 56, 59, 102; Ex.

P-17 at Response Nos. 18, 19, 24 and 26.

These actions make sense

only if the O'Rourkes intended to return to Florida and intended to
remain in Utah only for a temporary and special purpose, an action
which

courts

domicile.

have

long

recognized do

not

effect

a

change

in

See Gates v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 199 F.2d 291

(lOth Cir. 1952); McDowell v. Friedman Bros. Shoe Company, 115 S.W.
1028

(Mo.

1909).

("Domicile

See

also,

Tax

Commission

Rule

865-9-2I(D)

. is the place in which a person has voluntarily

fixed the habitation of himself and family, not for a mere special
or temporary purpose, but with the present intention of making a
permanent home . . . . ")
The Commission's and this Court's reliance upon only the
O'Rourkes' physical contacts in Utah in determining that they were
domiciled here is inconsistent with the requirements of established
case law and statute.
(1875)

("To

indispensable:

See Mitchell v. United States, 88 U.S. 350

constitute

a

new

domicile,

two

things

are

First, residence in the new locality; and second,

the intention to remain there . . . ");Grace Drilling Company v.
7

Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

(when reviewing

decisions of administrative bodies, Courts must consider and review
the whole record and consider not only the evidence supporting the
administrative body's findings,

but also evidence that detracts

from the weight of the administrative body's evidence).
II.
THIS COURT MISAPPREHENDED OR OVERLOOKED
LEGAL AUTHORITY WHICH HOLDS THAT NO
CHANGE IN DOMICILE TAKES PLACE WHERE A
PERSON IS PRESENT IN A PLACE FOR A
TEMPORARY OR SPECIAL PURPOSE, EVEN WHERE
THAT PERSON IS PRESENT IN THAT LOCATION
FOR SEVERAL YEARS.
In

the

Opinion,

this

Court

affirmed

the

Commission's

findings that the 0' Rourkes voluntarily abandoned their domicile in
Florida as a result of their extended absence from that state and
because they had substantial contacts in the State of Utah.

This

holding, however, misapprehends or overlooks unrebutted evidence in
the record that the O'Rourkes came to Utah only for a temporary or
special purpose.
Under
O'Rourkes'

established

intent

to

domiciliary

return

to

law,

Florida

so

was

long

based

as

the

upon

the

occurrence of an event which could be reasonably anticipated to
occur,

that intent cannot support a finding that they abandoned

their domicile in Florida.
(D.C.S.D. Cal. 1927)
residence

elsewhere,

See Petition of Oganesoff, 20 F.2d 978

(established domicile not lost by temporary
even

for

a

Chrysler, 26S P. 92 (Colo. 1928)

period

of

years),

People

v.

(citing Jain v. Bossen, 62 P. 194

(Colo. 1900), for the proposition that temporary residence outside
8

1n

("domicile;;

nor

~xtended pe~lod

:nc~uae

of

seve~

t

habitacion _n a particular place for

a mere spe
.::::ecor:d,

Based

.:...s

clear

the

J'Rourkes

intended to remaln ln Utah only temporarlly and untll c.ney were
able to construct a home in Florida to which they could return.
This intention was based upon the occurrence of an event which
could be reasonably antic; nat<?d t:o f""'\r"',....,,,....

property, r
substantlal

wen~

nee

informed tha·::: .. :JP

lncome.

wnlcn

construction of the home
When t:·1ey

:)r;:J

coula
~- o ~

noe groves would generate
cnen

ne

usea

ror

cne

Ex
s : ::-·

.7:P1ocated

rues tior

't-

. ''< . . .: groves would
genera~e

home

sufficient _ncorne cc prov.:...de ts=

on

UH:::

proper:·cy

and

for:

~he

construct_cn

l.t=LULH

Lllt=Le.

a
VHJ..f

unanticipated and highly unlikely events (such as the unprecedented
series

c~

of

hard

~astern~~-

freezes

Tines

'"'-

in

Florida,

Mr.

O'Rourke's

brother's

';'Rourke's parents' unexpected retur; '::o

Florida and the sudden downturn ln the Utah real estate market)
prevented the O'Rourkes from returninq to Florida.
Each decision made bv the O'Rourkes during the neriods in
----,.! "---

c -

~

...::::oeen

1:c cusastrous event::.:::; prevented them
q

from doing

so.

Accordingly,

notwithstanding

James

0' Rourke's

sporadic contacts in Utah and the contacts Mrs. O'Rourke had with
the State, the Commission's conclusion that the O'Rourkes abandoned
their domicile
0' Rourkes'

in Florida

special

and

is

not

temporary

supportable
purpose.

in light
See

of

Gates,

the

supra

(intention of taxpayer to return to original horne after he acquired
sufficient business experience in another location is an intention
based on an event which may be

reasonably anticipated;

former

absence from original domicile not deemed to be abandonment of
original domicile) ; McDowell, supra (family which gave up residence
in one city and moved to another for two years with hope that
warmer

climate

would

benefit

daughter's

health

did

not

lose

domicile in first city since, while remaining away, they had the
intent of returning to the first city when their daughter's health
improved).
III.
THE COURT OVERLOOKED AND/OR MISAPPREHENDED THE
REQUIREMENTS IN TAX COMMISSION RULE 865-9-2I(D)
AND RELEVANT CASE LAW IN FINDING THE PETITIONER
JAMES O'ROURKE WAS DOMICILED IN UTAH FROM 1983
TO 1.988.
Although the Court relied on Tax Commission Rule 865-92I (D)

an

authority

which

Petitioner

believes

is

not

only

relevant, but controlling -- it failed to provide any guidelines
for determining when a domicile in another state has been abandoned
and a new domicile in Utah has been established.

In its Opinion,

the Court had the opportunity to articulate an analytical framework
for determining when a person becomes domiciled in Utah.
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Instead,

the Court's Opinion left this already confused area of the law even

The Petitioners concede that, taken -=ts
support

a. .i... ..~...i.J.U...i...u~

~...ua. ....

U

V CJ...

contacts with Utah.

I,.....J..l.C

:f

However,

whole, ·c:e ""1cts

;l

b Lu...J.::)

C:Cl..L i::J

La..L~L. .i..o.l

the facts should not be lumped

together and viewed in a vac,mrn
· yeare ana

rlou
aCL

d..i..~

present dur_;_ng eaCh

u~

the years

~

ro

queStlOll.

lL

viewed in context, tell a story of a famlly that moved to Utah to
~omnorarilv
tht~y

r;ui:

t:

escape the rigors and dangers of urban Florida whilo
. '

.l ,.

incenclons ,._.;:_ _ _

permanent

t...:\~;2. ____

property and made lt:

_

Florida

h::)me

auntrysl~

-·...:....:.:...--:.';;.;;·....;. ------ .:: ___ .:....:.a

1

lmposslole .tor t:nem t:o ret:urn wnen t:ney

intended.
, aw n.nd

concluding that the
chey possessed

lll

Roun'.:e:::; · lntent

l~a~.

was the same lC:::ent

l.? 8 S

!!le C:ormnlSSlon· s

simply

noHilng,

as auopcea DY

this Court overlooks or misapprehends crucial facts and telescopes
the facts into a sinqJ.e analytical period with

u t:..c:ill.

'shocgun

approacL

LU

•.

n~

__,, _.,,r

.L..Cl\,.,..l,..

jiscussio~

flndu:..g

~f

simply

confers a form of standardless discretion on the Commission and

O'Rourkes

Instead

th~

set

fooL

-aurt'
~--~

.l

.Oecarns

notwl tnst:analng t:nelr express lntent to return to Florlda.
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The

Petitioners' intent is rendered irrelevant by such an analysis and
the approach taken by the Tax Commission and this Court rejects an
entire body of law related to domicile law and completely writes
out of existence the "special or temporary purpose" test set forth
in Tax Commission Rule 865-9-2I(D) and the 183 day rule embodied in
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-103. 1
The Opinion gives the State of Utah the "green light" to
tax,

as

residents,

persons

who

have

absolutely no

intent

of

becoming domiciled in the state or who are here for a period for
less than the 183 days set forth in §59-10-103, as long as that
person has some minimal physical contacts with the state to which
the Commission can point.

As a result, taxpayers could conceivably

be subjected to taxation by two states -- a state other than Utah
based on the person's intent to be domiciled therein, and Utah
based on the person's contacts within the state.
The Tax Commission and this Court utilized an ad hoc
approach to resolve the question of domicile that flies in the face
of the Utah statute, Commission Rules and relevant case law.

It is

respectfully submitted that the law requires an analysis of the
taxpayer's intent.

Such an analysis was not accomplished by the

result oriented approach taken by the Commission and implicitly
adopted by the Court.

1This section provided that a "resident individual" is (i) "an
individual who is domiciled in this state for any period of time
during the taxable year, but only for the duration of such period;
or (ii) an individual who is not domiciled in this state but
maintains a permanent place of abode in this state and spends in
the aggregate 183 or more days of the taxable year in this state."
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CONCLUSION
The
intending

made _;

t

0' Rourkes

came

for

relevant time;:; r.o retuc;

ar

:...mpossible for them

Commission

to Utah

'F1 d

t-his r·' mrt

:~.)

ret:.ur:-1 as

a

1- -~

temporary purpose,
,,

:;r:.~a

)rigina::_~cy

.

A er,

::.r:tended.

The

misapprehended facts .:md 'caw

Utah.
tct.l..L 1 • <

.o llldl T: dua - :-: ~, its analysls of James 0' Rourke and Bever

0'R.ouLKe; 3nd

1

c~J

:-:LL~.1ng

to ana.lyze this case
: 11

,lc~·"~·rL;,i_

e f f e :: t

.

r:_ 11. ::~

.. z1.n:::r

a..A

: ;iJ.on

person and each tax year at issue.
The Opinion gives no consideration to the facts in their
proper context and as

they arose over a

period of years and

provides little or no guidance to the Commission, attorneys or tax
payers regarding an analytical framework for determining residency
status for tax purposes where unrebutted testimony regarding intent
is at odds with other indicia of domicile or where a taxpayer is
present in the state for a temporary or special purpose.
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Accordingly,

the Court should grant the 0' Rourkes Petition for

Rehearing.
DATED this 27th day of February, 1992.
& LETA

hen
rneys for Petitioners
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hereby certify thac
Februarv

1 c.

~

causea

a·:

't

~

~9

~ana

ael_v~reQ

-~-:.e

J

.. s

: oregoing

Mark E. Wa1nwr1gnc, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
36 South State, 11th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah ~411:.
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